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CRISIS IN ICELAND: DEPOSIT-
GUARANTEE SCHEME FAILURE AND 
STATE LIABILITY 
BENJAMIN C. KELSEY* 
Abstract: On January 28, 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Free 
Trade Association States held that Iceland was not required to compensate 
foreign depositors of Landsbanki, an Icelandic bank, when the deposit-
guarantee scheme failed to reimburse depositors following the 2008 financial 
crisis. The court supported its conclusion with the text of the Directive that es-
tablished deposit-guarantee schemes as well as policy arguments regarding 
consumer protection and moral hazard. The court also found that Iceland’s 
failure to repay foreign depositors did not constitute an act of discrimination. 
Although the court correctly interpreted both the text and policy goals of the 
Directive, the precedential value of the court’s decision may be limited due to 
the severity of the 2008 crisis. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 financial crisis had a profound impact on economies world-
wide, but the small island-nation of Iceland was hit particularly hard.1 In fact, 
ninety-three percent of the commercial banking sector in Iceland had failed 
by March 2009.2 One of the many banks that collapsed was Landsbanki 
Íslands hf (Landsbanki).3 Landsbanki provided online savings accounts under 
the brand name Icesave to depositors in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (UK).4 When Landsbanki failed and the deposit-guarantee scheme 
was unable to provide reimbursement for lost deposits, the European Free 
Trade Association Surveillance Authority (Surveillance Authority) claimed 
that the State of Iceland was obligated to pay Icesave’s liabilities.5 
                                                                                                                           
 * Benjamin Kelsey is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 Cracks in the Crust, ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12762027, 
archived at https://perma.cc/27KU-87ZV. 
 2 Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland, 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct. 3, 20 (2013), 
available at http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/AnnualReports/EFTA_Court_
Report_Book_1_2013.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/9CM5-JD57. 
 3 Id. at 18. 
 4 Id. at 16–17. 
 5 Id. at 24–25. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (Surveillance Authority) oversees the EFTA 
states of Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein and monitors their compliance with their obligations 
under the Agreement on the European Economic Area. See Agreement on the European Economic 
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In January 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade As-
sociation States (EFTA Court) ruled on the State of Iceland’s liability to Ice-
save’s foreign depositors.6 In EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, the 
EFTA Court held that Directive 94/19/EC (the 1994 Directive), which pro-
vides minimum rules regarding the establishment and operation of deposit-
guarantee schemes, did not impose liability on the State of Iceland in a 
“systemic crisis of the magnitude experienced in Iceland” in 2008 through 
2009.7 In addition, the court found that Iceland, in not reimbursing deposi-
tors from the Netherlands and the UK, did not commit an act of discrimina-
tion contrary to the 1994 Directive or Article 4 of the Agreement on the Eu-
ropean Economic Area (EEA Agreement).8 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief factual and procedural history 
of EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland. Part II offers a discussion of the 
EFTA Court’s reasoning in finding for the defendant. This section reviews 
the court’s interpretation of the 1994 Directive and also examines the 
court’s opinion on the role of moral hazard and consumer protection in the 
context of a deposit-guarantee scheme. Part III argues that the court correct-
ly incorporated the goal of consumer protection and the risks of moral haz-
ard into its analysis, but that the long-term effect of the court’s decision is 
difficult to determine given the European legislature’s subsequent amend-
ments to the 1994 Directive. 
                                                                                                                           
Area arts. 55, 56, concluded May 2, 1992, 1801 U.N.T.S. 3, 21–22 (entered into force Jan. 1, 
1994) [hereinafter EEA Agreement]; About the Authority, EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY, 
http://www.eftasurv.int/about-the-authority/the-authority-at-a-glance-/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/88HR-L9CP. The Surveillance Authority monitors compliance with 
EEA rules on competition, state aid, and discrimination, among other things. About the Authority, 
supra. 
 6 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 54. The EFTA Court has jurisdiction over 
EFTA states that are parties to the EEA Agreement and deals mainly with infringement actions 
brought by the Surveillance Authority against EFTA States. See Introduction to the EFTA Court, 
EFTA COURT, http://www.eftacourt.int/the-court/jurisdiction-organisation/introduction/ (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PHK7-KQDQ. 
 7 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 44. 
 8 Id. at 51, 53. The EEA Agreement entered into force on January 1, 1994. EEA Agreement, 
supra note 5, at 4 n.1. The EEA Agreement binds together the EU Member States and the EFTA 
States, creating a single market. See Introduction to the EFTA Court, supra note 6. EU legislation 
on the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital applies to EFTA States through the 
EEA Agreement. See id.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Landsbanki’s Collapse 
On January 1, 2000, Iceland enacted Act No 98/1999, which created 
the Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund (TIF).9 In accordance with 
the 1994 Directive, deposits at the British and Dutch branches of Lands-
banki were under the responsibility of the TIF.10 In addition, Landsbanki 
branches in the UK and the Netherlands joined the respective deposit-
guarantee schemes in their host countries.11 
The worldwide financial crisis in 2008 manifested itself in Iceland 
through a drop in the value of the Icelandic kronur, inflation, and the na-
tionalization of the country’s three largest banks, including Landsbanki.12 
As a result of the crisis, Landsbanki’s Icesave website in the Netherlands 
and the UK stopped functioning on October 6, 2008, and depositors were 
unable to access their deposits.13 The following day, Landsbanki collapsed 
and the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) took control of 
the bank.14 The next day, the UK government froze the assets of Landsbanki 
in the UK.15 Then, the following week, the District Court of Amsterdam 
appointed administrators to handle all of Landsbanki’s assets and dealings 
with its customers.16 
Between October 9 and October 22 of that year, domestic Icelandic de-
posits in Landsbanki were transferred to a new bank, New Landsbanki, which 
was established by the Icelandic Government.17 The transfer of domestic de-
posits to New Landsbanki was based on a decision by FME as part of its ef-
fort to restructure Icelandic banks.18 On October 27 and thereafter, the FME 
“made statements triggering an obligation” for the TIF to make payments to 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland, 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct. 3, 16 (2013). TIF 
is the abbreviation for the Icelandic translation of Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund, 
Tryggingarsjóður innstæðueigenda og fjárfesta. TRYGGINGARSJÓÐUR INNSTÆÐUEIGENDA OG 
FJÁRFESTA [DEPOSITORS’ AND INVESTORS’ GUARANTEE FUND], http://www.tryggingarsjodur.is/ 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2015) (Ice.), archived at http://perma.cc/2Q2S-HJUV. 
 10 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 17. 
 11 Id. When the Dutch branch of Landsbanki joined the Netherlands deposit-guarantee 
scheme, deposits were insured up to a minimum of EUR 40,000 per depositor. Id. This was later 
raised to EUR 100,000 per depositor. Id. For British depositors, deposits in excess of the amount 
insured by the Icelandic TIF were insured by the British scheme up to a maximum of GBP 50,000. 
Id. 
 12 Cracks in the Crust, supra note 1. 
 13 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 17.  
 14 Id. at 18. 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id.  
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. 
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Landsbanki depositors in the UK and the Netherlands.19 In late 2008, deposit-
guarantee schemes in the UK and the Netherlands paid compensation to 
Landsbanki depositors in their respective countries.20 The TIF, however, nev-
er made any payments.21 
B. Procedural History Before the EFTA Court 
On May 26, 2010, the Surveillance Authority issued a letter of formal 
notice to Iceland for failure to ensure that Icesave depositors in the UK and 
the Netherlands received their guaranteed compensation.22 In reply, the Ice-
landic government argued that it was not in violation of its obligations un-
der the 1994 Directive or Article 4 of the EEA Agreement.23 Following fur-
ther exchanges, the Surveillance Authority brought an action in the EFTA 
Court against Iceland on December 15, 2011, seeking a declaration that Ice-
land had failed to comply with Articles 3, 4, 7, and 10 of the 1994 Di-
rective.24 The Surveillance Authority alleged further that Iceland’s actions 
constituted discrimination contrary to the 1994 Directive and Article 4 of 
the EEA Agreement.25 
The EFTA Court  also granted the European Commission’s request to 
intervene in support of the Surveillance Authority.26 In addition, the Gov-
ernments of the UK, Liechtenstein, Norway, and the Netherlands submitted 
written observations.27 
II. DISCUSSION 
To reach its finding, the EFTA Court considered both the text of the 
1994 Directive as well as its underlying policy goals as articulated in the 
1994 Directive’s preamble.28 The court relied on Articles 4 and 7 of the 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Id. at 19. 
 20 Id.  
 21 See Jill Treanor & Simon Bowers, British and Dutch Authorities Claim £5.3bn Over Ice-
land Banking Crash, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/feb/
11/iceland-banking-crash-claim-fund, archived at http://perma.cc/3YKQ-PZM6. 
 22 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 21. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 22. 
 25 Id. at 46. 
 26 Id. at 22, 23, 26. The European Commission supported the Surveillance Authority’s posi-
tion because it believed that any other interpretation would render the provisions incapable of 
achieving the 1994 Directive’s goal. Id. at 26. 
 27 Id. at 23. As might be expected, the governments of the UK and the Netherlands submitted 
observations in support of the Surveillance Authority. See id. Norway and Liechtenstein supported 
Iceland’s position that the 1994 Directive does not impose upon Iceland the obligation to compen-
sate foreign depositors following a crisis of the magnitude experienced in Iceland. Id. at 30–32. 
 28 Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland, 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct. 3, 44 (2013). 
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1994 Directive as well as Article 4 of the EEA Agreement in considering 
the Surveillance Authority’s discrimination claims.29 
A. The Court’s Interpretation of the Text of the 1994 Directive 
The EFTA Court began its analysis of the 1994 Directive by noting that 
one of the “principal characteristics of directives is precisely that they are 
intended to achieve a specific result” while leaving the means of achieving 
that result up to the discretion of the EEA State itself.30 The substantive pro-
visions of the 1994 Directive determine the nature of the result to be 
achieved.31 The Surveillance Authority alleged that the 1994 Directive was 
intended to achieve the specific result of ensuring that foreign depositors were 
compensated.32 In analyzing this alleged obligation, the court addressed Arti-
cles 3, 7 and 10 of the 1994 Directive, but made no mention of Article 4 until 
its discussion of the discrimination allegation.33 
Article 3 of the 1994 Directive reads, “Each Member State shall ensure 
that within its territory one or more deposit-guarantee schemes are introduced 
and officially recognized.”34 The court found that Article 3 relates only to the 
introduction and proper functioning of the deposit-guarantee scheme.35 It is 
meant to guarantee to depositors that the credit institution in which they make 
a deposit is part of a deposit-guarantee scheme.36 Although states must fulfill 
certain advisory tasks—such as ensuring that credit institutions comply with 
their obligations as members of a deposit-guarantee scheme—the Article does 
not envisage that EEA States have to ensure the payment of aggregate depos-
its in all circumstances.37 
Article 7 of the 1994 Directive stipulates the minimum level of cover-
age that deposit-guarantee schemes must provide to depositors.38 The text 
of the version of Article 7 that was in force during the relevant time period 
(“old Article 7”) provided that, “Deposit-guarantee schemes shall stipulate 
that the aggregate deposits of each depositor must be covered up to . . . .”39 
The court noted that the European legislature had since amended the text of 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. at 51, 53. 
 30 Id. at 32. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 24. 
 33 Id. at 35, 37–38, 50. The Surveillance Authority claimed that Iceland had an obligation to 
compensate foreign depositors based on Articles 3, 4, 7 and 10 of the 1994 Directive. Id. at 22. 
 34 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on 
Deposit-Guarantee Schemes art. 3, 1994 O.J. (L 135) 8 [hereinafter 1994 Directive]. 
 35 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 35–36. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id.  
 38 1994 Directive, supra note 34, at art. 7. 
 39 Id. 
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Article 7 to require that, “Member States shall ensure that the coverage for 
the aggregate deposits of each depositor shall be . . . .”40 This “Member 
State” language replaced the “deposit-guarantee scheme” language from the 
old Article 7.41 The court interpreted this new version of Article 7 as oblig-
ing EEA States themselves to ensure a certain level of coverage.42 From this 
change in language, the court reasoned that the European legislature found 
it necessary to expand the responsibility of EEA States beyond the mere 
establishment of an effective deposit-guarantee scheme framework.43 Ac-
cordingly, the obligation created by the old Article 7 was limited to provid-
ing national rules that imposed a minimum coverage level for deposit-
guarantee schemes. It did not require states to ensure compensation if a de-
posit-guarantee scheme were unable to meet its obligations.44 
In addition to establishing the minimum level of coverage required of 
deposit-guarantee schemes, Article 7 states, “Member States shall ensure 
that the depositor’s rights to compensation may be the subject of an action 
by the depositor against the deposit-guarantee scheme.”45 The court found 
that this provision required only the maintenance and adoption of rules al-
lowing a depositor to file an action against the deposit-guarantee scheme 
itself in the case of non-payment.46 This obligation cannot be extended to 
require that the EEA State itself compensate depositors when the deposit-
guarantee scheme cannot do so.47 The court did not explicitly elaborate up-
on its reasoning for not extending this obligation, but it appears that the 
court relied heavily on the text of the 1994 Directive, which only requires 
states to protect the depositor’s right to legal action.48 
Finally, Article 10 establishes time limits within which deposit-
guarantee schemes must compensate depositors.49 The court found that the 
obligations imposed by this Article are merely procedural in nature and re-
quire only that states provide a mandatory and effective procedural frame-
work with respect to time limits.50 More specifically, the Article ensures 
that EEA States may not release deposit-guarantee schemes from the rela-
tively short deadlines imposed by the Article except in “exceptional circum-
                                                                                                                           
 40 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 36–37. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 37. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 1994 Directive, supra note 34, at art. 7. 
 46 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 37. 
 47 Id. at 37–38. 
 48 See id. 
 49 1994 Directive, supra note 34, at art. 10. 
 50 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 38. 
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stances” or “special cases.”51 The court held that an obligation for states to 
compensate depositors in the event that the deposit-guarantee scheme is 
unable to do so could not be derived from this purely procedural Article.52 
Thus, the court found that the text of the 1994 Directive provides only 
for the establishment of a deposit-guarantee scheme and a procedural frame-
work through which it must be governed.53 The text of the 1994 Directive 
does not envisage that a state itself must compensate depositors when the de-
posit-guarantee scheme fails to do so.54 
B. The Court’s Interpretation of the Objective of the 1994 Directive 
In addition to the text of the 1994 Directive, the court looked to the 
overall purpose of the 1994 Directive to support its conclusion.55 The court 
interpreted the 1994 Directive’s objectives to be twofold: (1) to ensure free-
dom for banks to provide banking services across EEA states and (2) to pro-
tect both consumers and the stability of the banking system.56 The court 
derived these objectives from the 1994 Directive’s preamble.57 
In order to further the 1994 Directive’s first goal, Article 3 provides that 
a credit institution may be exempted from participation in a deposit-guarantee 
scheme by the EEA State when it belongs to an alternate system that meets a 
number of specific requirements.58 The court noted that one of these require-
ments is that states themselves cannot offer a guarantee to the credit institu-
tion.59 Consistent with the 1994 Directive’s goal of providing freedom to of-
fer banking services throughout Member States, this restriction was designed 
to limit the anti-competitive impact that a state-funded deposit-guarantee 
                                                                                                                           
 51 1994 Directive, supra note 34, at art. 10. 
 52 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 38. 
 53 See id. at 35–38. 
 54 Id. at 44. 
 55 See id. at 34. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 11, 40. The court cites to Recital 23 to support the proposition that the 1994 Di-
rective’s objective is for the banking system to function in the interests of consumers and the 
economy as a whole. Id. The Recital reads:  
Whereas it is not indispensable, in this Directive, to harmonize the methods of fi-
nancing schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institutions themselves, given, on 
the one hand, that the cost of financing such schemes must be borne, in principal, by 
credit institutions themselves and, on the other hand, that the financing capacity of 
such schemes must be in proportion to their liabilities; whereas this must not, how-
ever, jeopardize the stability of the banking system of the Member State concerned 
. . . . 
1994 Directive, supra note 34, at pmbl. 
 58 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 41. 
 59 Id. 
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scheme would have.60 Indeed, if the state itself could ensure deposits at a par-
ticular bank, that bank would have a competitive advantage over a bank 
backed only by a private deposit-guarantee scheme.61 The court therefore rea-
soned that were a Member State legally obligated to ensure the compensation 
of depositors, the anti-competitive impact of such an assurance would run 
counter to one of the 1994 Directive’s objectives.62 Accordingly, the court 
held that, had the European legislature intended to adopt the state-funded ap-
proach to deposit-guarantee schemes, it would have done so explicitly.63 
The court also found an additional problem with the idea of a state-
backed deposit-guarantee scheme: moral hazard.64 Specifically, if deposit-
guarantee schemes were to be backed by the state itself, banks would have 
less of an incentive to act in a responsible manner, knowing that the state 
would always be there to save it from the adverse consequences of its risk-
taking.65 The court noted that such state support specifically counters the 
intent of the European legislature, which wrote in Recital 16 of the 1994 
Directive’s preamble that such support “might in certain cases have the ef-
fect of encouraging the unsound management of credit institutions.”66 Such 
unsound management could imperil the stability of the banking system, thus 
undermining the 1994 Directive’s second goal.67 
The court further reasoned that the 1994 Directive’s goal of consumer 
protection necessarily involves a balance of the costs and benefits thereof.68 
When consumer protection goes past a certain point, the costs of such pro-
tections can become counter-productive and actually expose the consumer 
to a greater risk of harm.69 Although the court did not specifically identify 
where the tipping point is, it found that, in this case, the costs to the con-
sumer of a state-backed deposit-guarantee scheme would outweigh the ben-
efits that it provides.70 Thus, requiring Iceland to reimburse foreign Icesave 
depositors would contradict the objectives of the 1994 Directive under 
which deposit-guarantee schemes are mandated.71 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See id. at 41–42. 
 61 See id. at 41. 
 62 Id. at 41–42. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See id. at 42–43. 
 65 See id. at 43. 
 66 Id. at 42–43. 
 67 See id. at 40. 
 68 See id. at 43. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id. at 44. 
 71 See id. at 43–44. 
38 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 38:E. Supp. 
C. The Court Finds No Discrimination 
In its second and third pleas, the Surveillance Authority contended that 
Iceland, in failing to compensate Icesave depositors in the Netherlands and 
the UK, violated anti-discrimination provisions in both the 1994 Directive 
and Article 4 of the EEA Agreement.72 The court, however, disagreed and 
dismissed both pleas.73 
The 1994 Directive requires that depositors at any branches established 
by credit institutions in other EEA States belong to the deposit-guarantee 
scheme established in the home EEA State.74 Because both foreign and do-
mestic depositors must be treated equally when it comes to payment of min-
imum compensation in the event of institutional insolvency, the 1994 Di-
rective prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality by the deposit-
guarantee scheme itself.75 More generally, the court found that “the princi-
pal of non-discrimination inherent in the Directive requires that there should 
be no difference in the way a deposit-guarantee scheme treats depositors, 
and the way it pays out its funds.”76 
The court held that there was no violation of the 1994 Directive’s anti-
discrimination policy in the present case because no difference in the treat-
ment between domestic and foreign Icesave depositors was possible.77 After 
Landsbanki failed, domestic deposits were transferred to New Landsbanki 
based on a decision by the FME.78 The transfer of domestic deposits took 
place between October 9 and October 22, 2008.79 This occurred before the 
TIF was obligated to make payments to depositors on October 27, 2008.80 
Thus, at the time that the deposit-guarantee scheme was obligated to make 
payments, the funds of domestic depositors were not covered by TIF.81 
Since neither the funds of domestic depositors nor foreign depositors were 
covered by the deposit-guarantee scheme on October 27, there was no dif-
ference in the way the scheme treated depositors and thus no discrimina-
tion.82 
The court also found no acts of discrimination contrary to Article 4 of 
the EEA Agreement.83 The court pointed out that the Surveillance Authority 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. at 46. 
 73 Id. at 51, 54. 
 74 Id. at 50. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 51. 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 18. 
 80 Id. at 19, 51. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 51. 
 83 Id. at 53–54. 
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limited the scope of its application by alleging discrimination not in Ice-
land’s transferring only domestic deposits to New Landsbanki, but only in 
the failure of the Icelandic government to ensure that depositors in the 
Netherlands and UK receive compensation.84 Framed in this manner, the 
Surveillance Authority must first show that Iceland was under an obligation 
to ensure payments to foreign depositors in order to prove the allegation.85 
The court already found that this obligation does not exist under the 1994 
Directive and went on to explain that it cannot be derived from Article 4 of 
the EEA Agreement alone.86 Thus the plea could not succeed and must be 
dismissed.87 
As a result of the court’s decision, Iceland did not compensate Ice-
save’s foreign depositors and the EFTA Surveillance Authority was ordered 
to pay its own legal costs and those incurred by Iceland.88 
III. ANALYSIS 
In EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, the court not only properly 
interpreted the text of the 1994 Directive but also, critically, emphasized the 
1994 Directive’s policy goals.89 The court correctly reasoned that the 1994 
Directive’s goal of consumer protection precluded finding Iceland liable to 
foreign depositors.90 Appropriately, the risk of moral hazard also played a 
significant role in the court’s analysis.91 Significantly, the court settled the 
question of Iceland’s liability under the 1994 Directive as it stood in 2008.92 
The ultimate relevance of this determination, however, is not clear given the 
European Parliament’s subsequent amendments to the 1994 Directive.93 
Recital 16 in the 1994 Directive’s preamble prescribes that one of its 
goals is consumer protection.94 Although the court acknowledged that the 
preamble is not a legally binding portion of the agreement, it used the pre-
amble to guide its interpretation and application of the 1994 Directive.95 
The court recognized that if Iceland were forced to compensate foreign de-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. at 52. 
 85 Id. at 53. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. at 53–54. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland, 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct. 3, 43–44 
(2013). 
 90 See id. at 43. 
 91 See id. at 42–43. 
 92 Id. at 54. 
 93 See id. at 36–37; Eyvindur G. Gunnarsson, The Icelandic Regulatory Responses to the 
Financial Crisis, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 33, 34 (2011). 
 94 See 1994 Directive, supra note 34, at pmbl. 
 95 See EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 33. 
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positors, it could ultimately hurt consumers more than if the deposit-
guarantee scheme were allowed to fail.96 Essentially, a banking crisis, par-
ticularly one as large as Iceland’s, could lead to an even more serious sover-
eign debt crisis.97 The court weighed the costs and benefits of consumer 
protection and determined that a potential sovereign default is a cost that is 
not justified by the protection provided by a state-funded deposit-guarantee 
scheme.98 In a way, the court’s decision in EFTA Surveillance Authority is a 
recognition that the banks in Iceland were in fact “too big to bail.”99 
This, of course, raises the question of the extent to which the court’s de-
cision in this case was influenced by the sheer magnitude of Iceland’s finan-
cial crisis.100 The language of the opinion suggests that the size of the Ice-
landic crisis was important in the court’s analysis of state liability.101 Consid-
eration of the magnitude of the crisis is also taken into account in the court’s 
balancing the costs and benefits of consumer protection.102 Furthermore, im-
plicit in the court’s analysis is the idea that deposit-guarantee schemes are not 
designed to alleviate system-wide failures, but rather to protect consumers in 
the event of the collapse of a single small or medium-sized bank.103 Given the 
extent of the crisis in Iceland, and the potential repercussions for consumers if 
the state were to be liable, the court correctly held that the 1994 Directive did 
not contemplate state liability under these circumstances.104 
Another cost of state-funded deposit-guarantee schemes that the court 
shrewdly incorporated into its analysis is that of moral hazard.105 Again, the 
court’s interpretation of the 1994 Directive was guided by the 1994 Di-
rective’s preamble, which cautions against the risk of moral hazard.106 The 
court recognized that if it found Iceland liable to foreign depositors, it could 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See id. at 43. 
 97 See Cracks in the Crust, supra note 1. 
 98 See EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 40. 
 99 See id. at 43; Gunnarsson, supra note 93, at 38. 
 100 See EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 39; Gunnarsson, supra note 93, at 
38. 
 101 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 39, 43–44. The court’s holding reads, 
“[T]he Court holds that the Directive does not envisage that the defendant itself must ensure pay-
ments to depositors . . . in a systemic crisis of the magnitude experienced in Iceland.” Id. at 44 
(emphasis added). 
 102 See id. at 40. 
 103 See id. at 39; Gunnarsson, supra note 93, at 31. 
 104 See EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 41–42; Gunnarsson, supra note 93, 
at 33, 34. 
 105 EFTA Surveillance Auth., 2013 Rep. EFTA Ct., at 42–43. 
 106 See id. Recital 16 of the 1994 Directive reads, in relevant part, “[I]t would not be appropri-
ate to impose throughout the Community a level of protection which might in certain cases have 
the effect of encouraging the unsound management of credit institutions . . . .” 1994 Directive, 
supra note 34, at pmbl. 
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create the type of moral hazard the 1994 Directive itself warns against.107 If 
the sovereign state bails out a financial institution, then that institution and 
those like it are insulated from the costs of their risky activity.108 Financial 
institutions, then, are incentivized to act in an imprudent manner because 
the state will be there to bail them out.109 Thus moral hazard, in addition to 
being a threat against which the 1994 Directive warns in its own right, in-
centivizes financial institutions to act in a way that undermines consumer 
protection.110 The court, therefore, was right to factor the risk of moral haz-
ard into its analysis.111 
Although the court arrived at the correct decision given the particular 
circumstances in this case, the relevance of the court’s decision to future 
disputes is difficult to determine.112 Following the crisis in Iceland, the Eu-
ropean Parliament replaced key text in Article 7 of the 1994 Directive.113 
The court suggested that this new language would require the state to ensure 
a certain level of coverage if a deposit-guarantee scheme were to fail.114 If 
this were the case, it would seem that the impact of the court’s decision in 
this case would be limited to settling this individual dispute, as the amended 
Directive (2009 Directive) more clearly stipulates state liability.115 
The 2009 Directive, however, falls short of explicitly stating that in the 
event of the failure of a deposit-guarantee scheme the state itself would be 
liable to depositors.116 The European Parliament, at the time it amended the 
1994 Directive, was certainly aware of the question of state liability following 
a deposit-guarantee scheme failure.117 As commentators have pointed out, the 
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legislature’s failure to explicitly address this question in the text of the 2009 
Directive suggests that it still did not intend to impose full state liability under 
such circumstances.118 
Thus, the overarching question of state liability for deposit-guarantee 
schemes established under the 2009 Directive appears to remain unan-
swered.119 The court’s decision in EFTA Surveillance Authority offers cogent 
analysis, but forfeits its usefulness to the extent that the ruling was driven by 
the sheer magnitude of the crisis in Iceland.120 With the European Parlia-
ment’s failure to explicitly address the question in its 2009 Directive, similar 
issues will likely be brought to the court in the future.121 
CONCLUSION 
In EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, the EFTA Court found that, 
under the 1994 Directive, Iceland had no obligation to compensate foreign 
Icesave depositors following its banking crisis. The court focused on the 
text of the 1994 Directive but also prudently incorporated the policy goals 
of the 1994 Directive into its analysis. The court’s decision was, at its core, 
driven by concerns of consumer protection and moral hazard. Although the 
impact of its decision on international banking going forward is unclear, the 
EFTA Court made the right decision regarding Icesave. 
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